Cataclysm of Houston's Metrorail Expansion

The decision to rapidly extend the reach of Houston's successful MetroRail project will, in my opinion, lead to a reduction in the public value of the project — which will defeat the potential urban growth that might have resulted had the project been implemented more slowly.

The first (red) line was successful because it connects highly dense, walkable areas. Businesses respond positively to increasing walk-in traffic that the line brings, and more businesses will probably open along this central spine. But the new lines travel through less dense corridors, in general. Stops will occur in less dense, less walkable areas, and businesses will not feel the incentive to open near them. Lacking in local flavour, these semi-urban areas will generally not grow as a result of the lines.

Without mutual support from and to the local urban fabric, the lines will not gain adequate ridership.

Had the lines been implemented gradually, each line would have contributed to the uniqueness and accessibility of a local area. One at a time, each of the areas could have supported a minor mushrooming of businesses along the line. All together, the lines form a cataclysmic development, reducing relative land value gains in each area, and will probably not provide incentive for local areas to start any transit oriented development.

The Observer and the Decider

I stumbled upon the US's Transportation Research Board's website, and it struck my fancy that there are thousands of people employed in an industry that the governments of East Africa (see previous post) don't believe necessary: data collection.

The industry of transportation analysis appears more booming than I ever imagined. Data gathering, reports, and monthly conferences are all the endpoint of apparently substantial quantities of public investment.

We read numbers and ridership levels and five-year outlooks, but for what? The power of a study lies in the recommendation that it spurs — without the recommendation the study becomes impotent.

Of course the purpose of a study is to provide empirical evidence, but without further action all we have is words. Words spoken to millions are still just words.

None will know so much to do with evidence, as those that provide it in the first place. Thus the observer must also become the decider.

To be the most effective, the electorate should hand over the role of decisionmaking to the people that understand the situation best — the analysts. I think it should the analysts' decision to take action. But perhaps this is stepping out of the bounds of expectation.

On Expenditure

I am baffled by the sheer amount of public motivation and effort required to stop construction of a highway — and that the same amount of effort is required to start a transit initiative.

Consider the Spadina Expressway in Toronto, or Robert Moses's various plans for cross-Manhattan expressways. That these plans required momentum to stop — to prevent them from being built — is a testament to the blind motivation of urban planners of recent decades.

That transit takes such great initiative to start, and is subject to further public scrutiny than highway construction, is undoubtedly because the public will not only fund construction and maintenance (as is with roads) but also operation of transit infrastructure.

Nevertheless we should consider ridership first. But if we think a highway through greenfields will provoke new development, why shouldn't transit do the same?